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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
This matter is before the court on an appeal fr om an 
order of the district court dated September 30, 1999, 
denying American Cardiovascular Systems' ("ACS") motion 
for a stay of patent infringement litigation pending 
arbitration pursuant to 9 U.S.C. S 3. ACS sought a stay in 
this litigation brought by Medtronic/Arterial Vascular 
Engineering,1 Inc. ("A VE") so that it could enforce the 
arbitration clauses in two agreements containing a release 
and a covenant not to sue, respectively, into which ACS 
had entered with C.R. Bard, Inc. ("Bar d"). After ACS and 
Bard executed these agreements, AVE, in 1998, purchased 
Bard's coronary catheter business. At that time Bard 
assigned the two agreements to AVE. A VE and ACS agree 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Medtronic, Inc. acquired AVE in January 1999 and thus AVE has been 
known as Medtronic AVE, Inc. since that time. The district court, by an 
order dated October 22, 1999, allowed the caption of the consolidated 
cases to be amended to reflect the name change. 
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that the arbitration clauses are valid and that their 
provisions bind them, but AVE asserts that the claims it 
advances in this patent infringement litigation ar e outside 
the scope of the two agreements. The district court agreed 
with AVE and ACS appeals. We will affirm the district 
court's order denying the motion to stay the litigation 
pending arbitration because Bard never owned the claims 
involved in this litigation and, as a result, disputes 
regarding them are not subject to the arbitration provisions 
of either agreement. Thus, although AVE has stepped into 
Bard's shoes, inasmuch as it owes to ACS only obligations 
it derived from Bard, the arbitration clauses in the two 
agreements do not apply to AVE's separate claims involved 
here. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
ACS's coronary stent delivery systems consist of small 
pieces of stainless steel that are laser cut fr om a tube and 
affixed to a stent delivery catheter. The FDA-approved 
coronary stent is pre-mounted on a catheter that positions 
the stent in the appropriate region of the blood vessel. The 
balloon end of the catheter is inflated to expand the stent 
and place it against the vessel wall. The catheter then is 
withdrawn. 
 
(a) The 1992 Agreement 
 
Bard, a company involved in the development, 
manufacture and sale of medical devices, sued ACS in 
1988, alleging infringement of certain of its patents for 
catheter technology. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced 
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., No. SA CV 88-646 JSL, 1989 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 18439 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 1989); app. at 352- 
56. ACS then sued Bard in 1990, alleging infringement of 
several of ACS's patents for catheter technology, but Bard 
asserted counterclaims for infringement of Bar d's catheter 
technology patents in that litigation. See Advanced 
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. C90-0503 
FMS, 1992 WL 478215 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 1992); app. at 
293-351. In January 1992, ACS and Bard settled the 
actions through an agreement (the "1992 Agreement") in 
which they cross-licensed various catheter patents to each 
other and agreed to pay royalties. 
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The 1992 Agreement contained mutual releases which 
provided that each party: 
 
       on behalf of [itself and its] respective predecessors, 
       successors, parents, subsidiaries, assigns, 
       stockholders, officers, directors, attor neys, agents, 
       employees and representatives hereby releases and 
       discharges the other party, and its r espective 
       predecessors and successors, parents, subsidiaries and 
       their respective assigns, stockholders, officers . . . from 
       any and all debts, claims, demands, damages, 
       liabilities, obligations, causes of action, agr eements, 
       suits, sums of money, and rights, whether known or 
       unknown, suspected or unsuspected, which are based 
       on any actions or inaction occurring prior to the date 
       of this Agreement and which the party now owns or 
       holds, or at any time heretofore owned or held, by 
       reason of any act, matter, cause or thing whatsoever 
       [subject to certain exceptions not relevant here]. 
 
1992 Agreement P 8; app. at 87-88. 
 
The agreement also provided for arbitration to settle 
certain disputes: 
 
       Any dispute between the parties concerning the 
       construction, interpretation, and effect of this 
       Agreement or any clause herein contained, or the 
       rights and liabilities of the parties hereunder , or the 
       coverage of any patent claims licensed herein, shall be 
       resolved, if necessary, by binding arbitration in 
       accordance with the commercial arbitration rules of the 
       American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon 
       the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered 
       in any court having jurisdiction thereof. 
 
1992 Agreement P 15.a; app. at 92. 
 
(b) The 1998 Agreement 
 
In 1997 Bard sued ACS for infringement of certain of its 
patents for catheters based on actions not cover ed by the 
1992 Agreement. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced 
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 997 F. Supp. 556 (D. Del. 1998); 
app. at 357-62. Then in 1998 Bard sued ACS again for 
infringement of its catheter patents. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. 
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Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., No. 98-120 (RRM) (D. 
Del.); app. at 363-67. To resolve these actions, Bard and 
ACS entered into a settlement agreement on or about April 
4, 1998, in which ACS agreed to pay Bar d $100,000,000, 
and the parties cross-licensed certain catheter patents to 
each other. This agreement did not contain any releases but 
did include mutual covenants not to sue which, with 
respect to Bard, provided as follows: 
 
       Bard and its Affiliates covenant not to sue ACS and its 
       Affiliates for any and all debts, claims, demands, and 
       liabilities, whether known or unknown, suspected or 
       unsuspected, which are based in any way on any and 
       all of ACS's and its Affiliates past and curr ent domestic 
       and foreign angioplasty catheters including stent 
       delivery catheters. For purposes of this section,`ACS's 
       and its Affiliates past and current domestic and foreign 
       angioplasty catheters including stent delivery catheters' 
       shall mean ACS's and its Affiliates past and curr ent 
       domestic and foreign angioplasty catheters including 
       stent delivery catheters and shall specifically exclude 
       any future modifications to such products. 
 
1998 Agreement P 4.b; app. at 110. 
 
The 1998 Agreement required ACS to deliver to Bard 
certain catalogues and materials which showed "current 
domestic and foreign angioplasty catheters including stent 
delivery catheters" to identify products exempted from suit 
by the Agreement. See app. at 110 (1998 Agreement P 4.b). 
The ACS Coronary Stent Delivery Systems, including the 
ACS RX Multi-Link and the ACS RX Multi-Link HP , were 
listed and pictured in the materials that ACS provided to 
Bard, and these products were the subject of the 
infringement action. See app. at 56-57. The U.S. and 
International Product Brochur es ACS delivered listed the 
integrated stent delivery systems which consist of a stent 
mounted on a stent delivery catheter. See  app. at 20-38. 
 
In this 1998 Agreement, Bard and ACS also agreed to 
settle certain disputes by arbitration as pr ovided in the 
following clause: 
 
       Any dispute between the parties concerning the 
       construction, interpretation, and effect of this 
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       Agreement or any clause herein contained, or the 
       rights and liabilities of the parties hereunder , or the 
       coverage of any patent claims licensed herein, shall be 
       resolved, if necessary, by binding arbitration in 
       accordance with the commercial arbitration rules of the 
       American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon 
       the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered 
       in any court having jurisdiction thereof. 
 
1998 Agreement P 13; app. at 116. 
 
(c) Actions Between ACS and AVE and A VE's Purchase of 
Bard's Business 
 
During the period of its disputes with Bard, ACS also was 
involved in litigation with AVE. ACS first sued AVE in 
December 1997 in the Northern District of California, and 
AVE sued ACS on February 18, 1998, in the District of 
Delaware. AVE's complaint for patent infringement of its 
stent technology patents against ACS involves two ACS 
coronary stent delivery systems: the ACS RX Multi-link 
Stent Delivery System and the ACS RX Multi-link HP Stent 
Delivery System. AVE also has advanced various state law 
claims against ACS (including breach of contract, 
misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition, and 
wrongful acquisition of property and conversion) regarding 
the development of the stent delivery systems and events 
that occurred between 1989 and 1991. Then, in April 1998, 
ACS brought a second patent infringement action in the 
Northern District of California against AVE. 
 
While these three actions were pending, on October 1, 
1998, AVE purchased the assets of Bar d's coronary 
catheter business which included its various catheter 
technology patents. See app. at 176. The 1992 Agreement 
allowed its assignment as long as the patents that were the 
subject of the Agreement were transferr ed, see app. at 95- 
96 (1992 Agreement P 22), and the 1998 Agreement allowed 
its assignment in connection with a merger , consolidation 
or sale of its stock or sale of the assets of its business. See 
app. at 119-20 (1998 Agreement P 20). Accordingly, Bard 
assigned all of its rights and obligations under the two 
agreements to AVE. 
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On February 8, 1999, in response to AVE's action against 
it and after the California court transferr ed the two cases 
pending before it to Delaware, ACS moved to stay AVE's 
district court action, Medtronic A VE, Inc. v. Advanced 
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., No. 98-80-SLR (D. Del.), pending 
arbitration of whether either the release in the 1992 
Agreement or the covenant not to sue in the 1998 
Agreement bars the action. In addition, ACSfiled a demand 
for arbitration. Obviously, the demand for arbitration was 
somewhat unusual as ACS predicated it on pr ovisions in 
agreements to which AVE was not a party when it brought 
the action. AVE opposed ACS's motion, ar guing that Bard 
never owned AVE's claims against ACS for infringement of 
AVE's stent patents or the state law claims involved in the 
litigation between AVE and ACS. AVE also argued that the 
Bard-ACS agreements did not cover these claims and that 
they were not subject to arbitration. 
 
In March 1999, the district court held a hearing on ACS's 
motion and then, on September 30, 1999, denied the 
motion. See app. at 5 (Mem. Order at 1). The district court 
held that it could not interpret the release of all claims held 
by Bard in the 1992 Agreement or its undertakings in the 
1998 Agreement as applying to separate claims held by 
Bard's assignee, AVE. See app. at 16 (Mem. Order at 12). 
The court stated that "[a]lthough catheters and stents may 
be bundled for marketing purposes, there can be no 
question but that catheters and stents involve dif ferent 
technology and patents and that AVE developed its stent 
technology independent of Bard [the assignor to AVE]." App. 
at 17 (Mem. Order at 13). 
 
Subsequently, ACS made a motion to rear gue its motion 
to stay the action pending arbitration or, in the alternative, 
for a stay pending appeal. On March 24, 2000, ACS 
withdrew its motion to reargue andfiled an appeal from the 
district court's September 30, 1999 order . On March 31, 
2000, ACS moved in this court to stay proceedings in the 
district court pending appeal, and, after AVEfiled its 
opposition to ACS's motion, a motions panel of this court 
referred ACS's motion to the merits panel by an order dated 
May 5, 2000. ACS, however, has withdrawn the motion as 
the district court has stayed the proceedings before it. 
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(d) Related Cases and Proceedings 
 
This case, Medtronic AVE, Inc. v. Advanced 
Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 98-80-SLR, has been 
consolidated with the two proceedings ACS br ought against 
AVE in the Northern District of Califor nia and which the 
California court transferred to the District of Delaware, 
Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. v. Arterial Vascular 
Engineering, Inc., No. 98-314, and Advanced Cardiovascular 
Systems, Inc. v. Arterial Vascular Engineering, Inc., No. 98- 
316. Medtronic, Inc., AVE's parent company, also has sued 
ACS twice regarding infringement of Medtr onic's stent 
patents. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular 
Sys., Inc., No. 97-2459 JMR/FLN (D. Minn.); Medtronic, Inc. 
v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. and Guidant Corp., 
No. 99-761 JMR/FLN (D. Minn.). ACS moved to stay the 
proceedings based on the arbitration clause in the 1998 
Agreement between Bard and ACS. The district court 
denied ACS's motion, and the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed. See Medtr onic, Inc. v. Advanced 
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 221 F.3d 1343 (table), 2000 WL 
637045 (8th Cir. 2000). The court ruled that as the parent 
corporation of AVE, Medtronic, Inc. was not bound to the 
1998 Agreement. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
(a) Jurisdiction 
 
The district court had jurisdiction over this patent 
infringement case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and 
1338(a). We conclude for the reasons we set forth that we 
have jurisdiction over the appeal of the denial of the motion 
to stay pending arbitration pursuant to 9 U.S.C. 
S 16(a)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. S 1294(1). 
 
The parties in their primary briefs indicated, without 
substantial discussion, that this court has jurisdiction over 
this appeal under 9 U.S.C. S 16(a)(1)(A). W e, however, 
questioned this point inasmuch as the district court's 
jurisdiction was based in whole or in part on 28 U.S.C. 
S 1338 so that under 28 U.S.C. S 1295(a) the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit would have 
exclusive jurisdiction over an appeal from a"final decision" 
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in this case. Accordingly, we directed the parties to file 
supplemental briefs on the jurisdictional point. In their 
supplemental briefs they have adhered to their position that 
we have jurisdiction. 
 
After considering these briefs we have deter mined that we 
have jurisdiction and thus we adjudicate this appeal on the 
merits. Our starting point is 9 U.S.C. S 16(a)(1)(A) which 
makes the order in this case appealable. Section 16(a)(1)(A), 
however, does not indicate the court to which such an 
appeal may be taken. Thus, we examine the general 
statutes providing for the courts of appeals' jurisdiction. We 
conclude that section 1295(a) does not vest jurisdiction in 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit because this 
appeal is not from a "final decision." After all, rather than 
ending the litigation on the merits, see John Hancock 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 135-56 (3d Cir. 
1998), "the order ensure[d] that[the] litigation will continue 
in the District Court." Gulfstream Aer ospace Corp. v. 
Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 275, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 
1136 (1988); see Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer East, Inc., 
124 F.3d 551, 557 (3d Cir. 1997). Furthermore, we see no 
reason to regard the order asfinal under the collateral 
order doctrine as we are satisfied that even if it were not 
appealable under section 16(a)(1)(A), it effectively could be 
reviewed after entry of a final judgment in the district court. 
See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468, 98 
S.Ct. 2454, 2458 (1978); Queipo v. Prudential Bache Secs., 
Inc., 867 F.2d 721, 722 (1st Cir. 1989). Thus, section 
1295(a) does not vest jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit over the current appeal in this case. 
 
We also conclude that the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit could not have jurisdiction over this appeal 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(c) which vests it with exclusive 
jurisdiction over an appeal from an interlocutory order as 
described in 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1) or (b) in cases in which 
it would have jurisdiction over an appeal fr om a final 
decision under section 1295. Plainly section 1292(b) cannot 
be applicable as the procedures for allowing an 
interlocutory appeal as set forth in that section have not 
been followed here. 
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Thus, we are left to consider only section 1292(a)(1) 
which deals, inter alia, and as possibly applicable here, 
with orders refusing to grant injunctions. Upon 
consideration of that subsection we are satisfied, in 
harmony with Gulfstream, 485 U.S. at 287-88, 108 S.Ct. at 
1142-43, and in accordance with the weight of authority, 
that the order denying the stay should not be r egarded as 
appealable as an order denying an interlocutory injunction 
under section 1292(a)(1). See McLaughlin Gor mley King Co. 
v. Terminix Int'l Co., 105 F .3d 1192, 1193-94 (8th Cir. 
1997); Queipo, 867 F.3d at 722; see also Cofab, Inc. v. 
Philadelphia Joint Bd. etc., 141 F.3d 105, 108-09 (3d Cir. 
1998). 
 
In view of the foregoing analysis we come to the 
conclusion that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
would not have had jurisdiction if ACS had pr osecuted this 
appeal to that court. That conclusion, however , in itself 
does not mean that we do have jurisdiction. After all, what 
we have held with respect to the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit's lack of jurisdiction under section 1295(a) 
would apply equally to us if we attempted to exer cise 
jurisdiction under our usual source of jurisdiction, 28 
U.S.C. S 1291, as that section, like section 1295(a), 
provides for jurisdiction only over appeals fr om "final 
decisions." Moreover, we no mor e can exercise jurisdiction 
under section 1292(a)(1) by regarding the order denying the 
stay as an order denying an interlocutory injunction than 
could the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir cuit under 
section 1292(c)(1) which incorporates that section. Thus, 
this case is the unusual one that finally tur ns on the 
residual jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C.S 1294(1), which 
provides, with exceptions that we hold ar e inapplicable, 
that an appeal from a reviewable decision of a district court 
"shall be taken to the . . . court of appeals for the circuit 
embracing the district." Inasmuch as the appeal has been 
taken from the United States District Court for the District 
of Delaware, which is within this circuit, we have 
jurisdiction. 
 
In reaching our result we have not overlooked the opinion 
of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in In re BBC 
International, Ltd., 99 F.3d 811 (7th Cir. 1996), a case that 
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we brought to the parties' attention when we r equested the 
supplemental briefs. In BBC, the regional court of appeals 
held that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain a petition 
for a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1651(a) 
which authorizes courts of appeals "in aid of their 
respective jurisdictions" to issue writs. Id. at 812-13. In 
reaching its conclusion, the court indicated that the 
"[p]ower to issue writs of mandamus depends on [the] 
power to entertain appeals when the case ends," and it 
thus held that it did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ 
because any appeal from a final decision in the case would 
have to be taken to the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit. Id. at 813. Thus, for the court to determine 
whether it had jurisdiction to entertain a writ of mandamus 
it had to work backwards from its conclusion on the 
question of whether it would have jurisdiction at the time 
of a final decision. 
 
Here, however, our methodology is dif ferent as we are 
deciding the case on the basis of what court has 
jurisdiction now. Thus, our analysis in no way is confined 
by a provision such as that in section 1651(a) that a court 
may issue writs "in aid" of its jurisdiction. Consequently, 
the circumstance that the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit will have exclusive jurisdiction over any appeal from 
a final decision in this case does not requir e that we 
conclude differently than we do with r espect to our 
jurisdiction over the appeal in this case at this time. 
 
(b) Standard of Review 
 
We exercise plenary review over the legal questions 
concerning the applicability and scope of an arbitration 
agreement. See Harris v. Green T ree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 
173, 176 (3d Cir. 1999) (considering a district court's denial 
of a motion to compel arbitration and stay pr oceedings 
pending arbitration); Pritzker v. Merrill L ynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1113 (3d Cir . 1993). 
Nevertheless, to the extent that the district court predicated 
its decision on findings of fact, our standar d of review is 
whether those findings were clearly err oneous.2 See Kaplan 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. When a district court interprets language contained in contracts we 
review its determination under the clearly erroneous standard. See John 
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v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1509 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
(c) Court Decides Arbitrability of Dispute 
 
When Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 
U.S.C. SS 1-13, it provided a framework for the development 
of a body of uniform federal law gover ning contracts within 
its scope. Therefore, if the Arbitration Act is applicable, 
federal law applies in questions regarding the construction 
and enforcement of an arbitration clause, even in those 
cases in which the district court's jurisdiction is based on 
diversity of citizenship.3 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 
3353 (1985); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F .2d 99, 108 (3d 
Cir. 1984); Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker 
Autoradiowerk, 585 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir . 1978). Accordingly, 
if the Arbitration Act applies, federal law, including general 
principles of contract law, determines whether there is a 
valid arbitration clause. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. 
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 1924 (1995); 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
F. Harkins Co. v. Waldinger Corp., 796 F.2d 657, 658 (3d Cir. 1986). But 
if the district court engages in contract construction, we exercise 
plenary 
review. See id. at 659. "By `interpretation of language' we determine what 
ideas that language induces in other persons. By`construction of the 
contract,' as that term will be used her e, we determine its legal 
operation 
--its effect upon the action of courts and administrative officials. If we 
make this distinction, then the construction of a contract starts with the 
interpretation of its language but does not end with it; while the process 
of interpretation stops wholly short of a deter mination of the legal 
relations of the parties." Id. at 659 (citing 3 Corbin, Corbin on 
Contracts, 
S 534 at 9 (1960)). 
 
3. Although the Arbitration Act creates federal substantive law regarding 
agreements to arbitrate, it does not cr eate any independent federal- 
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1331. 9 U.S.C. S 4 "provides for 
an order compelling arbitration only when the federal district court 
would have jurisdiction over a suit on the underlying dispute; hence, 
there must be diversity of citizenship or some other independent basis 
for federal jurisdiction before the order can issue. . . . Section 3 
likewise 
limits the federal courts to the extent that a federal court cannot stay a 
suit pending before it unless there is such a suit in existence." Moses H. 
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 n.32, 103 
S.Ct. 927, 942 n.26 (1983). 
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Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626, 105 S.Ct. at 3353; Harris, 183 
F.3d at 178; Goodwin, 730 F.2d at 108. 
 
In appropriate circumstances, 9 U.S.C.S 4 allows 
litigants to obtain an order requiring a r eluctant party to 
arbitrate a dispute, as it directs the district court to order 
a party to arbitrate if it is "satisfied that the making of the 
agreement for arbitration or the failur e to comply therewith 
is not an issue." PaineWebber Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 
507, 510 (3d Cir. 1990); see Harris, 183 F.3d at 178-79. 
But under section 4 when one party refuses to arbitrate, 
the issue of whether the dispute is within the scope of the 
agreement requires district court r esolution. See AT & T 
Techs., Inc. v. Communication Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 
649, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418 (1986); PaineW ebber, 921 F.2d 
at 510-11. There is an issue in dispute in those 
circumstances because arbitration is "fundamentally a 
creature of contract," Kaplan, 19 F.3d at 1512, and thus 
arbitrators have the authority to resolve disputes only if the 
parties have agreed to submit to arbitration. See AT&T 
Techs., 475 U.S. at 648, 105 S.Ct. at 1418 (" `[A]rbitration 
is a matter of contract and a party cannot be r equired to 
submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed 
so to submit.' "). Accordingly, for a court to enter an order 
compelling arbitration there must be sufficient evidence 
that the parties consented to arbitration in an expr ess 
agreement. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf 
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1353 
(1960); Kaplan, 19 F.3d at 1512; PaineWebber, 921 F.2d at 
511; Par-Knit Mills, Inc. v. Stockbridge Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 
51, 54 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 
While a court asked to stay proceedings pending 
arbitration must determine whether ther e is a valid 
agreement to arbitrate and, if so, whether the specific 
dispute falls within the substantive scope of that 
agreement, "its function [nevertheless] is very limited when 
the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract 
interpretation to the arbitrator. It is confined to 
ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is 
making a claim which on its face is governed by the 
contract." United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 
363 U.S. 564, 567-68, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 1346 (1960); see also 
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United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 
36-37, 108 S.Ct. 364, 370 (1987). To deter mine whether a 
claim falls within the scope of an arbitration agr eement, the 
"focus is on the factual underpinnings of the claim rather 
than the legal theory alleged in the complaint." Svedala 
Indus., Inc., Civ. No. 96-4538, 1996 WL 590861, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. 1996), citing, inter alia, Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 622, 
n.9, 105 S.Ct. at 3351 n.9. If the court deter mines that 
there is an agreement to arbitrate and that the issue in 
dispute falls within the scope of the agreement, it must 
submit the matter to arbitration without ruling on the 
merits of the case. See Beck v. Reliance Steel Prods. Co., 
860 F.2d 576, 579 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
However, federal policy favors arbitration and thus a 
court resolves doubts about the scope of an arbitration 
agreement in favor of arbitration. See Moses H. Cone, 460 
U.S. at 24-25, 103 S.Ct. at 941; First Liberty Inv. Group v. 
Nicholsberg, 145 F.3d 647, 653 (3d Cir. 1998); Kaplan, 19 
F.3d at 1512. There is a "presumption of arbitrability." 
PaineWebber, 921 F.2d at 511; see Pritzker, 7 F.3d at 1114- 
15; Stateside Mach. Co. v. Alperin, 591 F .2d 234, 240 (3d 
Cir. 1979) ("doubtful issues regar ding the applicability of an 
arbitration clause are to be decided in favor of 
arbitration."). An order to arbitrate "should not be denied 
unless it may be said with positive assurance that the 
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpr etation 
that covers the asserted dispute." United Steelworkers v. 
Warrior, 363 U.S. at 582-83, 80 S.Ct. at 1353; see also AT 
& T Techs., 475 U.S. at 650, 160 S.Ct. at 1419; First Liberty 
Inv. Group, 145 F.3d at 653; Schulte v. Prudential Ins. Co. 
of Am. (In re Prudential Ins. Co.), 133 F.3d 225, 231 (3rd 
Cir. 1998); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Jewell Coal and Coke Co., 
735 F.2d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1984) ("So long as the 
appellant's claim of arbitrability was plausible, 
interpretation of the contract should have been passed on 
to the arbitrator."). Yet ther e is a limit as to how far a court 
should go in resolving a dispute in favor of arbitration 
because, as we stated in PaineWebber, while interpretive 
disputes should be resolved in favor of arbitrability, "a 
compelling case for nonarbitrability should not be trumped 
by a flicker of interpretive doubt." PaineWebber, 921 F.2d at 
513. 
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(d) The 1992 Settlement Agreement and Release 
 
As we have indicated, AVE does not dispute that it is 
bound by the agreements between ACS and Bar d, including 
the arbitration clauses. Accordingly, the question for us to 
determine is whether the district court err ed in holding that 
the dispute is not within the scope of the arbitration 
clauses. In the release4 contained in the 1992 Agreement, 
each party released the other party from demands, 
damages, liabilities, obligations, causes of action, 
agreements, suits, sums of money and rights, which were 
based on any actions or inaction occurring prior to the date 
of the agreement and which the party then owned or held. 
See app. at 87-88 (1992 Agreement P 8). The agreement 
also provided for arbitration of "any dispute between the 
parties concerning the construction, interpr etation and 
effect of this Agreement or any clause herein contained, or 
the rights and liabilities of the parties her eunder." App. at 
92 (1992 Agreement P 15.a). 
 
But even if AVE predicates its claims on property 
interests extant prior to the date of the 1992 Agreement, 
inasmuch as Bard did not then own or hold the interests of 
AVE, Bard could not have agreed to release ACS from or 
arbitrate claims relating to those inter ests. Accordingly, 
while it is true that when AVE accepted the assignment of 
the 1992 agreement from Bard it "step[ped] into [Bard's] 
shoes," see Premier Dental Prod. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply 
Co., 794 F.2d 850, 853 (3d Cir. 1986); Professional 
Collection Consultants v. Hanada, 62 Cal. Rptr . 2d 182, 
184, 53 Cal. App. 4th 1016, 1018-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997), 
the agreement to arbitrate cannot be applied to AVE's 
separate interests that Bard never owned. Therefore, 
although this litigation is extraordinarily complex, our 
resolution of it requires nothing mor e than the application 
of a rather straightforward principle. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. A release is a provision that intends a present abandonment of a 
known right or claim. By contrast, a covenant not to sue also applies to 
future claims and constitutes an agreement to exercise forbearance from 
asserting any claim which either exists or which may accrue. . . ." 
McMahan & Co. v. Bass, 673 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21, 250 A.D.2d 460, 461 
(1998). 
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ACS argues that Svedala Industries, 1996 WL 590861, 
supports the view that releases given by an assignor can 
bar independent, pre-existing claims of an assignee where 
the release explicitly applies to successors and assigns. It 
argues that, like AVE, the plaintif f in Svedala contended 
that the release could not bar its independent patent claims 
because the promisor did not hold rights to the patent at 
issue at the time of the release. In Svedala, two companies, 
Barmac and Tidco International, entered into a license 
agreement in 1988 regarding the `571 patent and related 
products that Barmac owned. The patent r elated to an 
impact breaking apparatus designed to r educe the size of 
certain minerals. Tidco and Svedala Industries, Inc. 
("Svedala Inc.") were sister companies, as both were 
subsidiaries of Svedala Industries, AB ("Svedala AB"). See 
Svedala, 1996 WL 590861, at *1. In 1993, T idco, Svedala 
Inc., and Svedala AB entered into a settlement agreement 
and mutual release with Kemper Equipment Inc. over 
certain disputes regarding the sales and operations of their 
respective crushing and screening equipment business and 
ancillary operations. See id. at *1. 
 
The release agreement provided that the parties on behalf 
of themselves and their respective: 
 
       predecessors, successors, heirs, assigns, . . . 
       subsidiaries, sister companies, parent companies and 
       all persons, connected with them fully release and 
       discharge the other and their respective predecessors, 
       successors . . . subsidiaries, sister companies, par ent 
       companies . . . from any and all claims, demands, 
       causes of action, obligations, damages and liabilities of 
       any nature whatsoever, whether or not now known, 
       suspected or claimed . . . . 
 
Id. at *1. About one year later in 1994 T idco acquired 
Barmac. See id. at *2. Then in 1996, T idco assigned the 
'571 patent Barmac previously owned to Svedala Inc. See 
id. at *2. Svedala Inc. then brought a lawsuit against 
Kemper and Rock Engineered for infringement of the '571 
patent. Kemper and Rock Engineered moved to stay the 
proceedings and to compel arbitration. See id. at *2. 
 
The court rejected Svedala's argument that Svedala 
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predicated on a contention that at the time of the 1993 
release agreement it had no rights in the '571 patent and 
therefore had no patent infringement claim to release so 
that the matter did not fall within the arbitration clause. In 
rejecting the argument, the court r easoned, inter alia, that 
although Svedala Inc. did not have rights in the patent at 
the time of the release, Barmac did have rights in the 
patent at that time, and Tidco is the successor of Barmac5 
and is a sister company to the plaintiff Svedala Inc. See id. 
at *4. The release specified that it applied to all successors 
and sister companies and all persons connected with them, 
and Svedala Inc., in addition to being a party to the release, 
was a sister company of Tidco (a party to the release) and 
also later an assign. See id. at *1. 
 
Obviously the situation in Svedala is completely 
distinguishable from that here. First of all, the plaintiff 
Svedala Inc. itself was a party to the broad 1993 release, 
whereas AVE was not a party to the 1992 release between 
Bard and ACS. Second, even if Svedala had not been a 
party to the release, Tidco was a party to the release and 
entered into it on behalf of its sister companies, of which 
Svedala was one. In this case, AVE was not bound to the 
release agreement between Bard and ACS through a 
relationship with either of the parties existing at the time of 
the execution of the release. Because the defendants in 
Svedala put forth evidence that they had made and offered 
for sale the accused infringing device prior to the time of 
the release, the fact that Svedala Inc. was a party to the 
release is relevant, even if the claim was unknown. 
 
In contrast, in this case, although Bard was a party to 
the release and later assigned the contract to AVE, at the 
time of the release Bard did not own and, in fact, never 
owned the patents that are now the subject of the suit 
between AVE and ACS. This is a crucial dif ference because 
here, unlike in Svedala, the party seeking to invoke the 
arbitration clause is trying to apply the clause in an action 
on a patent that was not acquired from a party to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We also note that the district court in Svedala apparently regarded 
Barmac as a predecessor of Tidco for purposes of the release. See 
Svedala, 1996 WL 590861, at * 4. 
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agreement to arbitrate. Thus, if AVE's action against ACS 
concerned patents that Bard acquir ed after the date of the 
release and Bard assigned the contract containing that 
release to AVE, this case would be in a very different 
posture. 
 
In another case that ACS cites to support its case, 
Universal Studios Inc. v. Viacom Inc., 705 A.2d 579 (Del. Ch. 
1997), two parties entered into a joint ventur e agreement 
relating to the cable television business that included a 
non-compete provision requiring that the participants not 
engage in the same business as the joint ventur e. See id. at 
583. Another party, Viacom, then bought the interests of 
one of the participants in the joint venture. This acquisition 
posed a problem because Viacom alr eady was in the cable 
business. After complex negotiations and business 
developments that we need not describe, litigation ensued. 
The court held that the non-compete clause was ef fective 
with respect to Viacom. See id. at 590-91, 600. 
 
Universal Studios is different fr om this case in that the 
parties there were involved in a joint venture and had 
signed a non-compete agreement and exclusivity 
agreement, and the purchaser of the inter est of one joint 
venturer stepped into its shoes thereby becoming as subject 
to the non-compete provision of the joint venture agreement 
as to all its other provisions. Accordingly, the joint venture 
agreement and the non-compete and exclusivity agreements 
gave rise to different fiduciary and contractual obligations 
and duties than those provided by a release or covenant not 
to sue which relate to obligations and claims of the parties 
subject to the agreement rather than claims of a third 
party. Thus, Universal Studios dealt with the obligations of 
a party to adhere to the terms of a joint venture when it 
acquired an interest in the ventur e. Accordingly, the factual 
pattern in Universal Studios is so distinct from that here 
that the case is not useful in resolving the controversy here. 
 
Reid v. Contel Cellular of Louisville, Inc., 208 F.3d 214 
(table), 2000 WL 303005 (6th Cir. 2000), is a more 
pertinent citation than Svedala and Universal Studios. In 
Reid, Contel acquired a portion of the business of McCaw 
Cellular, Reid's employer. Contel, however, though it hired 
other McCaw Cellular employees, did not hire Reid, 
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according to Reid because of her physical handicap. Reid 
then filed an action under Kentucky law against Contel in 
state court which was removed to the district court. Reid, 
however, remained McCaw Cellular's employee. 
 
Subsequently Reid left McCaw Cellular's employment and 
at that time received a severance package pursuant to 
which she released McCaw Cellular and its successors and 
assigns from all possible claims. Contel then successfully 
moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was a 
"successor/assign" of McCaw Cellular. On appeal, the court 
of appeals reversed, indicating that "Contel's assignee 
status vis-a-vis McCaw extends only to the subject matter 
contained within the purchase agreement and that it is 
illogical to allow Contel to benefit as assignee from every 
release to which McCaw has been a party since the date of 
the purchase agreement." Id. at * 2. 
 
We certainly agree with Reid because a contrary holding 
would have meant that the successor to a release could 
apply it to bar claims quite beyond anything the parties to 
the release could have contemplated. After all, a releasor 
giving a release to a second party hardly would anticipate 
that, as a result of an assignment, a thir d party could apply 
the release to a claim the releasor had against the third 
party that was quite independent of its claims against the 
second party. Reid, then, supports the r esult the district 
court reached in this case. 
 
Moreover, a release usually will not be construed to bar 
a claim which had not accrued at the date of its execution 
or a claim which was not known to the party giving the 
release. See Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 
F.2d 885, 895-96 (3d Cir. 1975). While it is true that cases 
ACS has cited support the view that a release can bar even 
unknown claims, these cases would be relevant only if it 
were Bard's unknown claims that AVE, stepping into Bard's 
shoes, wished to pursue against ACS. See id. at 894-96 
(holding that although ordinarily words of release will not 
be construed to bar unknown claim, parties intended to 
release accrued but unknown antitrust claims); San Diego 
Hospice v. San Diego, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 501, 504-05, 31 Cal. 
App. 4th 1048, 1052-54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). Inasmuch as 
AVE seeks to assert claims that Bard never owned, the 
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cases ACS cites are not relevant. Accor dingly, it can be said 
with "positive assurance" that the claims in this case which 
AVE asserts against ACS are not within the scope of the 
release in the 1992 Agreement and that A VE thus is not 
bound to arbitrate disputes regarding them. 
 
(e) The 1998 Settlement and Covenant Not to Sue 
 
The covenant not to sue in the 1998 Agreement provided: 
 
       Bard and its Affiliates covenant not to sue ACS and its 
       Affiliates for any and all debts, claims, demands, and 
       liabilities, whether known or unknown, suspected or 
       unsuspected, which are based in any way on any and 
       all of ACS's and its Affiliates past and curr ent domestic 
       and foreign angioplasty catheters including stent 
       delivery catheters. For purposes of this section,`ACS's 
       and its Affiliates past and current domestic and foreign 
       angioplasty catheters including stent delivery catheters' 
       shall mean ACS's and its Affiliates past and curr ent 
       domestic and foreign angioplasty catheters including 
       stent delivery catheters and shall specifically exclude 
       any future modifications to such products. 
 
1998 Agreement P 4.b; app. at 110. However, the covenant 
not to sue does not apply to AVE's separate claims that 
Bard never owned. 
 
In Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill v. 
Schubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft , 829 
F.2d 1075, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1987), defendant Schubert had 
entered into a license agreement with Murata Machinery, 
Ltd. ("Murata") in 1982. Under this agr eement, Murata 
granted a nonexclusive license to its patents to Schubert. 
See id. In 1983, Suessen sued Schubert for infringement of 
Suessen's '946 patent, which dominated the Murata 
patents under which Schubert had a license. See id. at 
1076. Suessen later bought Murata's technology and 
business from Murata in 1984. See id. at 1079. Schubert, 
in defense against Suessen's action, argued that it had an 
implied license under the Suessen '946 patent, as 
Schubert's actions were merely an exer cise of its license 
under the 1982 agreement. See id. Schubert also claimed 
that when Suessen acquired the Murata patents, it 
"stepped in the shoes" of Murata and ther efore was barred 
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by legal estoppel from suing Schubert for practicing the 
licensed technology. See id. 
 
The court rejected Schubert's argument for an implied 
license. Id. at 1080. Under the agreements at issue, 
Suessen had not made a promise not to sue under 
Suessen's separate patents, and treating it as such would 
be an overly broad interpretation. See id. at 1081. "[A] 
patent license agreement is in essence nothing more than 
a promise by the licensor not to sue the licensee. . . . 
Indeed, the patentee of X and his licensee, when making, 
using, or selling X, can be subject to suit under other 
patents." Id. 
 
Similarly, in ZapatA Industries Inc. v. W .R. Grace & Co., 
51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1619, 1620 (S.D. Fla. 1999), ZapatA 
Industries Inc. ("ZapatA") and Advanced Oxygen 
Technologies, Inc. ("AOTI") settled disputes between them 
by entering into a license agreement in 1991 under which 
AOTI was to receive ownership of the oxygen technology 
and all rights in related patents issued or applied for by 
either party and ZapatA was given licenses of all patents 
covering the oxygen technology and agreed to pay royalties 
to AOTI. See id. at 1622. In 1992, following a breach of 
contract dispute, ZapatA and AOTI entered a settlement 
agreement under which ZapatA agreed to assign all patents 
and patent applications to AOTI and the license agr eement 
was amended and would remain in effect unless the parties 
agreed on a new one. The settlement agr eement did not 
expand or amend the provisions of the license agreement in 
which each party had made the representation that as of 
August 1, 1991 (the date of the license agreement), the 
technology licensed to the other party did not infringe any 
third party patent rights. See id. at 1622-23. In 1991 and 
1992, after the date of the license agreement between AOTI 
and ZapatA, W.R. Grace & Co. ("Grace") independently 
obtained two patents (which AOTI never owned). See id. at 
1623. In 1995, Grace acquired AOTI's oxygen scavenging 
technology and its patents, under which ZapatA was 
licensed by AOTI. The purchase agreement did not contain 
a provision that would release ZapatA or any other third 
party from liability for infringing the Grace patents. See id. 
at 1623. 
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ZapatA claimed but Grace denied that ZapatA had an 
"implied license" under the Grace patents because Grace 
assumed AOTI's warranty of non-infringement under the 
AOTI-ZapatA settlement agreement. See id.  at 1625. 
Consequently, ZapatA instituted an action seeking a 
declaration that Grace was precluded fr om enforcing its 
patents against ZapatA by reason of implied license and 
estoppel. Grace filed a motion for summary judgment on 
this issue because AOTI never owned the Grace patents or 
had any rights under those patents and therefor e did not 
have any right under them to provide to ZapatA through 
the AOTI-ZapatA agreements. See id. The court stated: 
"ZapatA received nothing more fr om AOTI than a promise 
not to be sued by AOTI on AOTI's patents. That pr omise did 
not, and . . . could not, apply to Grace's patents which 
AOTI never owned and never had any rights under . To the 
extent Grace assumed the license, it owed ZapatA nothing 
more than what AOTI had owed. . . . Grace's`commitment' 
does not include a promise, express or implied, not to sue 
under Grace's own patents." Id. at 1626-27. 
 
While obviously Schubert and ZapatA involve facts 
distinct from those here, similar principles apply in this 
case. At the time of the 1998 Agreement, Bar d and ACS 
contracted for a covenant not to sue. When A VE stepped 
into Bard's shoes, it had to adhere to the covenant not to 
sue on Bard's claims. But absent a pr ovision stating 
otherwise, assignment of a contract will result in the 
assignee stepping into the shoes of the assignor with regard 
to the rights that the assignor held and not in an expansion 
of those rights to include those held by the assignee. "An 
assignment does not modify the terms of the underlying 
contract. It is a separate agreement between the assignor 
and the assignee which merely transfers the assignor's 
contract rights, leaving them in full force and effect as to 
the party charged. . . . Insofar as an assignment touches on 
the obligations of the other party to the underlying 
contract, the assignee simply moves into the shoes of the 
assignor." Citibank, N.A. v. T ele/Resources, Inc., 724 F.2d 
266, 269 (2d Cir. 1983). "[A]n assignment is intended to 
change only who performs an obligation, not the obligation 
to be performed." Capitan Enter ., Inc. v. Jackson, 903 
S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994)." `An assignee 
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obtains only the right, title and interest of his assignor at 
the time of his assignment, and no more.' " Id., citing State 
Fidelity Mortgage Co. v. Varner, 740 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Tex. 
App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1987). Thus, A VE did not by 
accepting the assignments from Bard limit its rights under 
the patents involved in this action which it did not obtain 
from Bard. 
 
ACS argues that if Bard had acquir ed a new patent the 
day after the 1998 Agreement was executed, the agreement 
by its terms would have prevented Bar d from asserting that 
new patent against the ACS products because the covenant 
not to sue is product based, not patent based. ACS 
maintains that the district court focused on the technology 
and the patents rather than the products.6 See Br. of 
Appellant 23. But the "stepping into the shoes" assignment 
means that even if Bard had obtained a new patent related 
to catheters the day after the Agreement was executed, AVE 
could not now sue ACS based on that patent if the 
covenant not to sue was interpreted to cover a patent that 
was obtained after the covenant not to sue was signed.7 
However, if AVE had acquired a new patent the day after 
the parties executed the 1998 Agreement, it still could sue 
on it because Bard never would have owned that patent 
and therefore the patent would not have been within the 
scope of the agreement. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The district court reasoned that ther e "can be no question but that 
catheters and stents involve different technology and patents and that 
AVE developed its stent technology independent of Bard. The plain and 
unambiguous language of the 1998 Agreement, therefore, demonstrates 
that the litigation at issue, involving stent technology, is not an 
arbitrable grievance under the 1998 Agreement." App. at 17 (Mem. Order 
at 13). 
7. It is uncertain whether the covenant not to sue would be interpreted 
to cover a patent that was obtained after the covenant not to sue was 
signed inasmuch as the covenant covers claims that are based on ACS's 
and its Affiliates past and current domestic and foreign angioplasty 
catheters including stent delivery catheters, specifically excluding any 
future modifications to such products. Therefore, it is possible that a 
patent obtained after this agreement still would be based on a "past or 
current" catheter; however, it is also possible that a patent obtained 
after 
the agreement would not be considered based on such a catheter and 
could, for example, be considered a "futur e modification." 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affir m the district 
court's order denying ACS's motion to stay the proceedings 
in the district court pending arbitration. 
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